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Abstract: 
This paper develops a bio-economic model to explore the effect on illegal hunting, wildlife 
conservation and human welfare of the most common instruments of existing ICDPs. It is 
demonstrated that stimulating working opportunities in the formal sector has the potential of 
promoting conservation, while money transfers and distribution of game meat to the local 
people fail, if not explicitly linked to the conservation objective. The analysis shows that such 
links, modelled as a risk of being excluded from the project if caught in illegal hunting, may 
be a more durable mean for ICDPs to reach its goal of improved wildlife conservation and 
human welfare. The model is illustrated by numerical calculations with data from Serengeti, 
Tanzania. 
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 1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) are widely launched as the 
solution to the problem of biodiversity loss in developing countries. In sub-Saharan Africa, 
ICDPs are frequently designed to encourage conservation by reconciling the management of 
protected areas with the social and economic needs of the local people (see Kiss 1990, Barbier 
1992, Brandon and Wells 1992, Wells and Brandon 1992, Barrett and Arcese 1995, Barrett 
and Arcese 1998, Songorwa 1999). Through benefit sharing it is expected that ICDPs will 
discourage poaching and promote economic development (see Kiss 1990 and Barbier 1992). 
The understanding is therefore that such a management scheme can improve the livelihood of 
rural communities without contributing to environmental degradation. There are several ways 
in which ICDPs can generate benefits for the local people, e.g. through revenue transfers from 
tourism, local job creation in the formal sector, stimulating increased productivity in the 
agricultural sector, and so forth. Benefit sharing is also obtainable through direct utilization of 
wildlife, such as harvesting quotas for the local communities and controlled culling 
operations. By providing such benefits, the ICDPs aspire to stimulate the local people to 
reduce wildlife exploitation (Brandon and Wells 1992, Wells and Brandon 1992, Gibson and 
Marks 1995, Songorwa 1999). 
 
However, ICDPs have recently attracted attention because of the untested assumptions behind 
the projects. Brandon and Wells (1992) give a broad and instructive discussion of the design 
dilemmas of ICDPs and describe some of the trade-offs inherent in linking conservation and 
development. Experience shows that many existing projects lack a direct link between the 
hunting activity of the local people and the conservation objective. As pointed out by Kiss 
(1990) and Brandon and Wells (1992), without such a link it is difficult for the local people to 
realize that there is a purpose of improved conservation behind the benefits they receive. If 
worst comes to worst, they may regard the benefits as lump-sum transfers and carry on the 
exploitation activities as before. Both Kiss (1990) and Brandon and Wells (1992) stress the 
necessity of establishing such a connection.  
 
The lack of a proper link in existing ICDPs is the point of departure for the present paper. The 
main purpose is to compare the performance of two different ICDP designs or regimes. The 
difference between the regimes is related to the implementation of one of the four ICDP tools 
of focus here. This tool is the benefit-sharing instrument which consists of distribution of 
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game meat from controlled culling and income transfers from the tourism sector. In the first 
regime, an ICDP is implemented without an explicit link between the benefit transfers and the 
hunting activity of the local people. That is, there is no risk of being excluded from these 
benefits if caught in illegal hunting. This corresponds to Barrett and Arcese’s model (1998) 
(see below) and is in line with the design of most existing ICDPs today (see Brandon and 
Wells 1992). In the second regime, the project designer implements a link by creating a 
continuous risk of being excluded from the benefit transfers if caught in illegal hunting. Then, 
if caught, the local people receive no benefits from the ICDP. There are, of course, other ways 
in which ICDPs can link the benefit transfers with the conservation objective. For instance, 
ICDPs may offer comprehensive training and education to the local people in order to make 
them realize that the magnitude of future transfers depends on the wildlife abundance – and 
consequently on their hunting activity – as more wildlife generates more income in tourism 
and opens for more extensive game culling. The link modelled here, however, is more direct 
and easier to implement because the performance of the project does not require that the local 
people behave in a self-enforcing and less myopic way.  
 
Barrett and Arcese (1998) reveal possible unintended outcomes of benefit sharing for wildlife 
conservation. They present a bio-economic model with no explicit link between the 
conservation objective and the benefit-sharing instruments. The economic part of the model 
consists of a representative household for the rural population in western Serengeti in 
Tanzania which derives utility from consumption of game meat, agricultural output and 
leisure. It is also assumed that no market exists for game meat, meaning that the meat is used 
for household consumption. First, they demonstrate that money transfers from tourism may 
lead to a smaller degree of wildlife conservation. This is because the money transfers produce 
a positive income effect on game meat consumption. Second, they show that the conservation 
effect of game meat distribution from controlled culling is negative. This is because 
distribution of free game meat increases the real income of the households, which increases 
the total demand for game meat. Hence, the analysis of Barrett and Arcese (1998) gives 
reasons to question ICDPs that rely on money transfers and culling operations1. 
 
As already mentioned, the main focus of this paper is to analyse under what conditions, and 
for which design, ICDPs relying on benefit-sharing instruments can promote wildlife 
conservation and human welfare. Quite similar to Barrett and Arcese (1998), the analysis 
demonstrates that, in absence of a link between illegal hunting and the received transfers, as 
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described above, benefit transfers will lead to a smaller degree of wildlife conservation. 
However, in contrast to Barrett and Arcese (1998), benefit sharing may promote wildlife 
conservation in presence of a link between the transfers and illegal hunting. It turns out that 
benefit transfers perform better if combined with more extensive use of guards and patrol 
units in the protected area. In this case, benefit sharing may also improve the economic 
conditions of the local community.  
 
In addition to the design of the benefit-sharing strategies, the present paper also looks at the 
role of working opportunities in the formal sector, improved productivity in agriculture and, 
as mentioned, anti-poaching law enforcement. The wage rate in the formal sector and the 
productivity in agriculture are considered independent of whether the local people are caught 
in illegal hunting. This assumption seems reasonable because ICDPs cannot fully control the 
conditions in these sectors. In the analysis of anti-poaching law enforcement the focus is on 
increased use of guards and patrols, in order to improve the detection rate, and an increase in 
the fine level imposed on the local people if they are caught. 
 
When it comes to agricultural policies, attempts to stimulate productivity improvements are 
repeatedly suggested in wildlife management  (see Brown et al. 1993). It is believed that this 
will divert labour away from wildlife hunting to agricultural production. However, Lopez 
(1998) demonstrates that this argument may be false, depending on for what type of crop the 
productivity increases; i.e. land-intensive crop or labour-intensive crop. Using a static model 
with fixed land endowments and no labour market, he shows that an increased price for the 
land-intensive output is likely to reduce the labour demand for farming, and hence increase 
the resource extraction. Also Schulz and Skonhoft (1996) discuss agricultural productivity 
and its impact on resource extraction. Focusing on the conflict between land as an input 
agricultural production and land for wildlife habitat, they demonstrate that a higher return on 
agriculture increases the conversion of land and is therefore a threat to wildlife conservation 
(see also Skonhoft 1999).  
 
Other contributors who question the importance of agricultural productivity are Bulte and van 
Soest (1999). Utilizing a dynamic model for a hunter-agrarian household, they demonstrate 
that the conservation effect of increased agricultural productivity is unclear and critically 
dependent on whether or not there exist markets for game meat and labour. With such markets 
present, the household solves the optimal effort in agriculture and hunting separately2. 
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Consequently, there is no effect on wildlife exploitation of improved productivity in 
agriculture. However, with no markets present, they demonstrate that the conservation effect 
of productivity improvements is ambiguous. These analyses indicate that ICDPs promoting 
agricultural productivity should be implemented with care, especially when it comes to land 
use conflicts and regional conditions such as the functioning of markets.  
 
The following analysis differs from the contributions quoted above in two important ways. 
First, while most of the authors referred to above limit their focus to benefit-sharing strategies 
and improved agricultural productivity, this paper also considers the impact of employment in 
formal sector and anti-poaching law enforcement. The main contribution of the paper is to 
suggest an ICDP design that will succeed in promoting wildlife conservation. As already 
mentioned, this involves an explicit link where the local people are excluded from the benefit 
transfers if caught in illegal hunting. Second, because ICDPs also aim at improving the 
economic conditions of the local people, the present paper extends the above contributions by 
exploring the welfare effect of the ICDP incentives. 
 
1.2. Assumptions   
This paper presents a bio-economic model of a hunter-agrarian community on the border of a 
protected area, i.e. a national park. The property rights to wildlife are held by the State which 
has appointed a park agency to manage the protected area. The local people have no legal 
rights to wildlife hunting, but the degree of anti-poaching law enforcement imposed by the 
park agency is not sufficient to eliminate illegal hunting and effectively protect the property 
rights of the State3.  
 
Throughout the analysis, the local people are considered the only active agent, while the park 
authority is passive (see also Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams 1992). This means that the 
State instructs the benefit-sharing strategies and the law enforcement activities on the park 
manager and, hence, these activities are implemented as exogenous4. This is contrary to the 
analyses of Skonhoft (1995), Skonhoft (1998), and Skonhoft and Solstad (1998) where the 
game culling and the level of law enforcement are determined within the model. Following 
Barrett and Arcese (1998), it is further assumed that game meat is distributed freely to the 
local communities and, consequently, this activity does not generate income for the park 
manager. However, the park agency benefits from non-consumptive use of the wildlife, such 
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as tourism. A fixed share of this income – pre-determined by the State – is transferred to the 
local people. 
 
As in Barrett and Arcese (1998), Lopez (1998), and Bulte and van Soest (1999), it is assumed 
that illegal hunting is only performed by the local people living in the vicinity of the protected 
area. Poaching carried out by outsiders is therefore ignored. In addition to illegal hunting, the 
local people are involved in agricultural production and offered work opportunities in the 
formal sector, such as employment in the local industry and tourism. A market for labour is 
therefore present and this is in accordance with the general model of Bulte and van Soest 
(1999), while Barrett and Arcese (1998) and Lopez (1998) assume that no such market exists. 
In contrast, there exists no market for game meat which may be a result of high transaction 
costs (see e.g. Sadoulet and de Janvry 1995). With no market for game meat the local people’s 
consumption is constrained by the transfers from the managed culls and the illegal offtake 
(see below, see also Barrett and Arcese (1998)). 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 2, while 
section 3 explores the conservation and welfare effects of ICDPs implemented without a link 
between the benefit sharing instruments and illegal hunting. That is, the local people receive 
the benefit transfers regardless of their involvement in illegal hunting. This regime is referred 
to as Regime I. In Regime II in section 4, the model is adjusted to investigate the performance 
of ICDPs where the local people face a risk of being excluded from the benefit transfers if 
caught in illegal hunting. Section 5 illustrates the theoretical model with a numerical example 
of the wildlife exploitation in Serengeti. The paper is closed by a discussion and concluding 
remarks in section 6. 
 
2. The model 
Consider a local community consisting of a homogeneous group of peasants living on the 
border of a protected area5. The local people produce two types of output; agricultural crops 
and game meat. The agricultural production is dependent on the amount of agricultural land, 
pesticides and fertiliser use, rainfall etc., as well as labour effort use. Following Barrett and 
Arcese (1998), Lopez (1998) and Bulte and van Soest (1999), all factors are fixed except for 
labour AE . Then, the production function reads 
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(1) )E(AA A= , 
 
where output increases by a decreasing rate in effort, 0'A >  and 0''A ≤ . 
 
The households produce game meat through illegal hunting of wildlife in the protected area. It 
is assumed that the wildlife offtake is a function of labour effort and the wildlife abundance, 
specified as 
 
(2) XEfh h )(= , 
 
where hE  is effort directed towards hunting and X is the wildlife stock. The offtake increases 
by a decreasing rate in effort, 0>'f  and 0≤''f 6. The degree of effort directed towards 
wildlife hunting is influenced by the fact that this activity is illegal. The probability of being 
caught in illegal hunting θ is given as 
 
(3) min=θ [1, δEh] 
θ increases with the hunting effort, but the probability of being caught cannot exceed 1 (see 
also Skonhoft and Solstad 1998). δ > 0 is the marginal rate of detection, which reflects the 
productivity or the level of law enforcement activities carried out by the park manager. For a 
given hunting effort, more extensive enforcement use increases δ and, hence, θ increases. If 
caught in illegal hunting, the households are imposed a fixed fine F.  
 
In addition to wildlife hunting and agricultural production, the local people have the 
opportunity to work in the formal sector (see section 1.2). Let N be the labour use in formal 
sector and T be the fixed available labour effort interpreted as the total human population 
living in the vicinity of the conservation area7. Then, the time constraint reads 
 
(4) TNEE Ah ≤++  
 
Throughout the analysis the time constraint is assumed to be binding, and hence, there is 
always a positive opportunity cost of labour use. As a result, a trade-off between effort in 
wildlife hunting and the legal activities is present. 
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The households derive utility from the consumption of agricultural output and game meat. 
There are two possible states in this model: either the local people will manage to escape the 
anti-poaching patrols with the probability )( θ−1 , or they will be caught with the probability 
θ. It is assumed that the decision problem of the local people is to maximize the expected 
utility given as 
 
(5) [ ] [ ])C(V)C(U)C(V)C(U)(EW cGcAeGeA +++−= θθ1  
 
Here, superscript ‘e’ denotes the resulting consumption levels if the local people manage to 
escape the patrol units, while superscript ‘c’ denotes the consumption levels if caught in 
illegal hunting. In order to simplify the analysis, the expected utility is specified as separable 
in agricultural and game meat consumption, where 0>⋅ )('U  and 0>⋅ )('V . The magnitude 
of the second order derivatives of U and V reflects the local people’s attitude towards risk. In 
general, the attitude towards risk depends on how wealthy the decision-maker is (see e.g. 
Dasgupta 1993, chapter 8). It is plausible that poor households would be more averse to 
accepting additional risk compared to relatively more wealthy agents, because the 
disadvantage of the risk, here represented by the monetary punishment, is particularly harsh 
for households who have little to fall back on. Because this analysis is related to poor 
communities in remote areas in developing countries, it is assumed that the local people are 
risk averse8.  This means that the expected utility function is strictly concave in agricultural 
and game meat consumption, i.e. 0<⋅ )(''U  and 0<⋅ )(''V .  
 
A trade-off in hunting effort is present in the expected utility function (5). First, more hunting 
effort increases the consumption of game meat which, in turn, increases the utility for a given 
consumption of agricultural output and probability of being caught. However, more hunting 
effort reduces the income from formal employment which restricts the agricultural 
consumption. This works in the direction of reduced utility. In addition, the realized 
consumption levels are, in general, higher if the local people manage to escape the patrol 
units, i.e. cA
e
A CC ≥  and cGeG CC ≥  (see below). Therefore, as more hunting effort increases the 
probability of being caught it reduces the expected utility level. The local people must 
consider these trade-offs when determining the allocation of labour effort between agricultural 
production, wildlife hunting, and employment in the formal sector. 
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The next step is to specify the prevailing constraints on consumption if the local people 
manage to escape the patrol units. First, the consumption of game meat consists of the illegal 
offtake and legal game meat distributed from the managed culls. In the following, these are 
considered homogenous. The extent of the game meat distribution is set as a fraction 0>m  of 
the wildlife stock X9. It is assumed that the local community in consideration is the only 
community to receive game meat from the culling program, which means that the whole 
amount mX is transferred to this community10. Because there is no market for game meat, the 
consumption of meat if not caught in illegal hunting is constrained as in (6)11.  
 
(6) mXX)E(fC h
e
G +=  
 
The consumption of agricultural output if not caught in illegal hunting is constrained by the 
level of agricultural production, income from formal employment, and the income transfers 
from tourism. The latter is set as a fixed fraction ∈µ [0, 1] of the net income in the tourism 
sector S(X). It is assumed that S(X) increases with the wildlife density as the number of 
tourists increases, but at a decreasing rate 0>'S , 0≤''S  (see Bulte and van Kooten 1996). 
Employment in formal activities is paid by the exogenous wage ω. Let AP  be the unit price of 
agricultural output. Then, if the local people manage to escape the patrol units, the 
consumption expenditure on agricultural output equals N)X(S)E(APCP AA
e
AA ωµ ++= . 
Solving this equation with respect to eAC  yields  
 
(7) AAA
e
A P/NP/)X(S)E(AC ωµ ++=  
 
In general )E(AC A
e
A >  which means that the local people will buy excess agricultural food 
on the market if they escape the patrol units. However, in absence of formal employment and 
an ICDP program (i.e. 0== µN ) the constraint in (7) reads )E(AC AeA = . In this case, the 
agricultural consumption is constrained by the production level in this community.  
 
The prevailing constraints on agricultural and game meat consumption if caught in illegal 
hunting are strictly dependent on the design of the ICDP. Sections 3 and 4 below outline in 
detail the resulting constraints for the respective regimes. The final step in this section is to 
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present the population dynamics of wildlife. As already noted, the local peasants are the only 
agents involved in illegal hunting, meaning that their hunting constitutes the total illegal 
offtake.  The natural growth of the population is specified as logistic, while the stock shrinks 
according to illegal hunting and managed culling, as given in equation (8). 
 
(8) mXX)E(f)K/X(rXdt/dX h −−−= 1  
 
Here, r is the intrinsic growth rate and K is the carrying capacity of the protected area. The 
total harvest equals the sum of the illegal offtake X)E(f h , and the managed harvest mX. The 
ecological equilibrium is defined by a constant wildlife stock over time. Solving for X at 
0=dt/dX  yields r/K)m)E(fr(X h −−= , so that wildlife abundance is reduced by m 
and hE . To obtain 0≥X , the man made mortality must be restricted by rm)E(f h ≤+ 12. 
 
Before we turn to the specific ICDP regimes, we need to establish how the local people adapt 
to the ecology. As already noted, the State has the property rights to wildlife, while hunting 
performed by the local people is illegal. The local people experience, through the property 
rights scheme and anti-poaching law enforcement, a continuing risk of being effectively 
denied access to hunting. It is therefore assumed that their behaviour is based on short-term 
expected utility maximization and hence, they do not take the stock density into account when 
maximizing expected utility. Technically, this means that the local people treat the stock 
density as an exogenous variable and this corresponds to one of Smith’s models (1975). See 
also Lopez (1998), Barrett and Arcese (1998), and Skonhoft and Solstad (1998). 
 
3. Regime I 
In this regime, the ICDP manager transfers money from tourism and game meat to the local 
people independent of whether they are caught in illegal hunting. Hence, if caught in illegal 
hunting, the resulting budget available for agricultural consumption is lowered by the imposed 
fine F only. The constraint on agricultural consumption is therefore given by 
 
(9) AAAA
c
A P/FP/NP/)X(S)E(AC −++= ωµ  
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In the absence of formal employment and an ICDP program, this constraint reads 
AA
c
A P/F)E(AC −= . This means that the local people must sell agricultural output to 
finance the imposed fine. However, in the presence of formal employment and an ICDP, the 
local people may purchase excess crops on the market as long as the additional income 
exceeds the imposed fine. 
 
The next step is to present the resulting constraint on game meat consumption if caught in 
illegal hunting. In line with Skonhoft and Solstad (1998), it is assumed that the local people 
keep the illegal meat if caught. That is, they manage to hide the meat from the patrol units. In 
addition, as already mentioned, they will receive game meat from the culling program even if 
they are caught poaching. The resulting constraint on game meat consumption if caught 
therefore coincides with the prevailing constraint if they manage to escape in (6), i.e. 
e
G
c
G CC = .  
 
Because the game meat consumption is independent of whether the local people are caught in 
illegal hunting, i.e. eG
c
G CC = , the expected utility function reads 
)C(V)C(U)C(U)(EW G
c
A
e
A ++−= θθ1 , where the superscript on GC  is omitted. 
Substituting the consumption constraints (6), (7) and (9), together with constraints (3) and (4), 
into this expression gives the expected utility function as 
{ })P/)EET(P/)X(S)E(A(U)E(EW AAhAAh −−++−= ωµδ1  
{ })P/FP/)EET(P/)X(S)E(A(UE AAAhAAh −−−+++ ωµδ )mXX)E(f(V h ++ . The 
local people must decide upon the optimal effort use in hunting hE  and agricultural 
production AE  in order to maximize its expected utility. Because the local people treat the 
wildlife stock as exogenous, they impose no shadow price on wildlife. The Kuhn-Tucker first 
order maximum conditions are then given in (10)-(11).  
 
(10) [ ] 01 ≤−+− )P/)E('A()C('UE)C('U)E( AAcAheAh ωδδ ; = 0 if 0>AE      
  
(11) X)E('f)C('V hG [ ] AcAheAh P/)C('UE)C('U)E( ωδδ +−− 1  
 [ ] 0≤−− )C(U)C(U cAeAδ ; = 0 if 0>hE  
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Equation (10) gives the optimal effort use in agricultural production IAE , where superscript I 
denotes the case of Regime I. In what follows, an interior solution for AE  (> 0) is assumed to 
hold, so that the first order condition (10) holds with equality. The first parenthesis is positive 
and, hence, this condition reads 0=− AA P/)E('A ω . This means that effort should be 
directed towards agricultural production until the value of the marginal product equals the 
wage rate in formal employment. Therefore, the agricultural productivity, the price of 
agricultural output, and the wage rate in formal sector are the only factors determining the 
optimal effort use in agricultural production. Hence, effort is allocated to agriculture 
independent of the amount of effort directed towards hunting and formal employment. This 
result is identical to what is demonstrated by Bulte and van Soest (1999).  
 
Equation (11) gives the first order condition with respect to the hunting effort IhE . The first 
term on the left hand side reflects the marginal expected utility from hunting where more 
effort in illegal hunting increases the expected utility due to increased game meat 
consumption. The second and third terms give the marginal cost or disutility from hunting. 
The second term implies that more effort use in illegal hunting reduces the time in formal 
employment and, consequently, reduces the budget available for consumption of agricultural 
commodities. In addition, as seen in the third term, more hunting effort increases the 
probability of being caught, which reduces the expected utility for a given consumption 
bundle. The local people will refrain from illegal hunting, i.e. 0=IhE , if the marginal 
disutility exceeds the marginal utility. This will be the case if the fraction of meat distributed 
to the community, the fine level, and the marginal probability of being detected are ‘high’. 
However, because the intention of ICDP is to promote wildlife conservation by stimulating 
the local people to reduce the poaching, the case of no illegal hunting will not be considered 
in the following. Instead, it is assumed that an interior solution for hE  exists, where the local 
people divert effort to illegal hunting until the marginal utility of hunting equals the marginal 
disutility.  
 
Having solved for IAE  through (10), 
I
hE  and X
I follow simultaneously in (8) (with dX/dt = 0) 
and (11), while NI is determined in (4). The resulting consumption of game meat and the 
agricultural consumption, depending on whether the local people are caught in illegal hunting, 
follows from (6), and (7) or (9), respectively.  
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The next step is to analyse how the benefit-sharing instruments of ICDP influence the hunting 
decision of the local people, wildlife conservation and local welfare. The comparative static 
results in ecological equilibrium are derived from the derivatives of (8) (with dX/dt = 0) and 
(11). The welfare effect follows from (5) when taking into account the impact of a changing 
wildlife stock13. See Appendix 1. Consider first the effect of an increase in the amount of 
game meat distributed from the managed culls to the local people, i.e. m increases. The direct 
effect on wildlife conservation is negative. The indirect effect works through a changing 
effort use in illegal hunting. Because there exists no external market where the local people 
can sell excess game meat, the only option is to consume the legal meat domestically (or 
within the community). The local people will therefore substitute illegal meat for distributed 
meat and reduce their effort in illegal hunting. Therefore, the indirect effect of game culling 
works in the direction of a higher degree of wildlife conservation. It can be demonstrated, 
however, that the direct connection is the dominating effect. Hence, while this policy fulfils 
the aim of reducing illegal hunting, the aggregate offtake increases and this lowers the degree 
of wildlife conservation. This result is in line with the findings of Barrett and Arcese (1998). 
By providing game meat to the local people, the management authority contributes to 
increased pressure on the wildlife stock. The wildlife is therefore more protected without this 
kind of interference from the authorities14. 
 
Second, an increase in the income from tourism, i.e. µ increases, leads to an increase in illegal 
hunting and a smaller wildlife stock. The mechanism works as follows: money transfers 
which are received for certain increase the level of income in both of the states ‘escape’ and 
‘caught’ (see section 2). This has two positive and quite similar effects on the hunting effort. 
First, it enables the local people to carry more risk. That is, they pay less attention to the 
probability of being caught when deciding upon the optimal use of effort in illegal hunting. 
Second, an increased certain income makes the local people less responsive to the fact that 
increased hunting effort reduces the income in formal employment. Both effects reduce the 
marginal cost of hunting and stimulate increased hunting effort. Consequently, certain income 
transfers reduce the degree of wildlife conservation15. Although the mechanism is somehow 
different, this result is in accordance with both Barrett and Arcese (1998) and Skonhoft 
(1998), and suggests that ICDPs relying on money transfers fail to conserve wildlife. 
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Third, the effect of a positive shift in the wage rate ω  in formal employment is generally 
unclear. All else equal, a higher wage level increases the certain income level. Quite similar to 
increased money transfers from tourism, this enables the local people to carry more risk and 
to draw back workers from the formal sector. Hence, this effect works in the direction of 
increased hunting effort. Compared to the money transfers from tourism, the difference lies in 
the fact that an increased wage rate in formal employment has a direct negative effect on 
hunting as it increases the alternative cost of effort use in this activity. The total effect is 
therefore unclear. However, if the latter effect dominates, then a higher wage rate will 
promote wildlife conservation. This will be the case if the employment in formal sector is 
initially ‘low’. See also Table 1. In this case, a higher payment in formal sector will also 
improve the economic conditions of the local people. The conclusion is therefore that ICDPs 
relying on work opportunities in the formal sector may fulfil the aim of promoting both 
wildlife conservation and local welfare.  
 
Fourth, improved agricultural productivity or a higher price of agricultural output AP  has an 
ambiguous effect on hunting effort and wildlife conservation. See Table 1. The effect is 
strictly dependent on the fine level. Recall from equation (9) that when the fine level is ‘low’, 
the local people will buy food on the market to supplement their consumption in both states. 
In this case, the effect of a higher agricultural price is ambiguous. On the other hand, when 
faced with a ‘high’ fine level the local people will sell excess agricultural output on the 
market in order to finance the penalty if caught in illegal hunting. That is, the local people are 
net producers of agricultural output in this state. Then, a higher agricultural price increases the 
level of income if caught in illegal hunting which, in turn, enables the local people to carry 
more risk. This effect works in the direction of increased hunting effort. There is also an 
additional effect present, working through the state where the local people manage to escape. 
In this state, they are net consumers of agricultural commodities and, consequently, a higher 
agricultural price reduces the income level and their ability to carry risk. It turns out that if 
fine level and the probability of being caught in illegal hunting are ‘high’, then the first effect 
dominates and the local people will increase the illegal hunting. See also Table 1. Hence, in 
situations of a high level of anti-poaching law enforcement, policies which stimulates a high 
agricultural return will lower the degree of wildlife conservation. This result is contrary to the 
arguments of Brown et al. (1993) and the findings of Skonhoft and Solstad (1998)16.  
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The final policy option is to increase the degree of anti-poaching law enforcement in order to 
increase the marginal cost of illegal hunting. This policy includes more extensive use of 
guards and patrols, which increases the probability of being caught, and a higher fine level. 
Obviously, such attempts will promote wildlife conservation. However, the effect on the 
welfare of the local people is ambiguous. See Table 1. While the direct welfare effect is 
negative, there is a positive indirect effect working through a changing wildlife stock, as more 
wildlife increases the transfers of game meat and money from the tourism sector. If the latter 
effect dominates, law enforcement will promote wildlife conservation and improve the 
welfare of the local people.  
  
4. Regime II 
The objective so far has been to investigate the impact on wildlife conservation and the 
welfare of the local people of the most common instruments of existing ICDPs. One of these 
instruments is benefit-sharing which consists of distribution of game meat and income 
transfers from tourism. Most existing ICDPs lack a proper link between the benefit transfers 
and illegal hunting, and section 3 demonstrated that transfers relying on this design do not 
have the potential of promoting wildlife conservation. Instead, it is clear that working 
opportunities in the formal sector provide, under given conditions, the most promising way of 
encouraging wildlife conservation and local welfare. 
 
Despite the fact that game meat distribution and income transfers fail in meeting the aims of 
today’s ICDPs, they are launched as having the potential to curtail illegal hunting and 
promote wildlife conservation. Therefore, the objective of this section is to look at an 
alternative design of the benefit-sharing strategies in order to reach the aim of integrated 
wildlife conservation and improved local welfare. In section 3 it was shown that a higher fine 
level reduces the illegal hunting pressure and promotes wildlife conservation. In addition, this 
policy may improve the economic conditions of the local people if the benefit transfers are 
‘high’. This suggests that one promising strategy may be to increase the costs of being caught 
in illegal hunting. One possible way is to attach an uncertainty to the benefit transfers so that 
participation in benefit sharing becomes conditioned by whether the local people are caught in 
illegal hunting. Then, in contrast to section 3, the transfers are no longer certain; the local 
people receive them if they manage to escape the patrol units, while they are denied transfers 
if they get caught. This section presents an ICDP design based on such a link between 
participation in benefit sharing and the imposed punishment if caught in illegal hunting.  
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Compared to Regime I, the present ICDP design restricts the resulting consumption 
possibilities of the local people if they are caught in illegal hunting. First, the local people 
receive no money transfers from tourism and, hence, 0=µ . The resulting constraint on 
agricultural consumption yields 
 
(12) AAA
c
A P/FP/N)E(AC −+= ω  
 
Second, the local people are excluded from the game meat distribution program if they get 
caught in illegal hunting. Then, the constraint on game meat consumption equals17  
 
(13) X)E(fC h
c
G =   
 
When inserting the consumption constraints in (6), (7), (12), and (13), together with the 
probability of being caught in equation (3) and the time constraint in (4), the expected utility 
follows as 
[ ])mXX)E(f(V)P/)EET(P/)X(S)E(A((U)E(EW hAhAAAh ++−−++−= ωµδ1  
[ ])X)E(f(V)P/FP/)EET()E(A((UE hAAhAAh +−−−++ ωδ . Again, the decision 
problem of the local people is to decide upon the optimal effort directed towards illegal 
hunting hE  and agricultural production AE  in order to maximize the expected utility. With an 
interior solution present (see section 3), the first order conditions for maximum are given in 
(14)-(15). 
 
(14) [ ] 01 =−+− )P/)E('A()C('UE)C('U)E( AAcAheAh ωδδ      
 
(15) [ ] X)E('f)C('VE)C('V)E( hcGheGh δδ +−1 [ ] AcAheAh P/)C('UE)C('U)E( ωδδ +−− 1  
 [ ] 0=−−+− )C(V)C(U)C(V)C(U cGcAeGeAδ  
  
Equation (14) gives the optimal effort use in agricultural production IIAE , where superscript II 
denotes Regime II. Again, the first parenthesis is positive, so that the first order condition 
reads 0=− AA P/)E('A ω . Hence, the presence of a link does not alter the result that the 
  
17
 
optimal effort use in agriculture is determined by the price and productivity in agriculture and 
the wage rate in formal sector, but independent of the effort use in hunting and formal 
employment. 
 
Having solved for IIAE  in (14), 
II
hE  and X
II follow simultaneously in (15) and (8) (with 
0=dt/dX ). The first order condition in (15) states that effort should be directed towards 
hunting until the marginal benefit (i.e. the first term) equals the marginal cost (i.e. the second 
and third term). For fixed parameter values, IcG
IIc
G )C()C( <  and IcAIIcA )C()C( < . 
Consequently, the first order condition in (15) differs in general from (11). In order to 
compare the regimes, consider first the impact of a link on the income transfers from tourism. 
Because there is an uncertainty attached to the income transfers in Regime II, the realized 
consumption level of agricultural output if caught in illegal hunting is lower than in Regime I. 
Therefore, as seen from the second term in (15), a link on the income transfers will increase 
the marginal cost of hunting and work in the direction of reduced hunting effort. There is an 
additional effect working through the fact that this link increases the gap between the 
consumption levels eAC  and 
c
AC . The resulting loss if being caught in illegal hunting is 
therefore higher in Regime II, which strengthens the negative impact on hunting effort. This 
means that ICDPs relying on a link between income transfers and the costs of being caught in 
illegal hunting will produce a higher degree of wildlife conservation.  
 
Consider now the effect on illegal hunting of implementing a link on the game meat 
distribution. First, compared to Regime I the realized consumption level of game meat if 
caught is now lower. This increases the marginal expected utility of hunting and leads the 
local people to increase their hunting effort in order to compensate for the uncertainty of the 
transfers of game meat. The second effect works through the fact that this link increases the 
gap between consumption levels eGC  and 
c
GC . The loss resulting from being caught in illegal 
hunting is therefore higher in Regime II. Hence, this leads towards reduced hunting effort (see 
the third term in (15)). The total effect on hunting effort and wildlife conservation of a link on 
game meat distribution is therefore unclear. The numerical analysis in section 5 demonstrates 
under which conditions ICDPs relying on such a link will perform better than the ICDP 
design of today.  
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The next step is to investigate the effect on wildlife conservation and the welfare of the local 
people of increased transfers of game meat and income from the tourism sector. The 
comparative static results are derived from the derivatives of (8) (with dX/dt = 0), (15), and 
(5) (see Appendix 1)18. First, consider the impact of increased game meat distribution m. In 
the same way as shown in section 3, the direct effect on hunting effort is negative as the local 
people substitute illegal meat for distributed meat in consumption. In the present scenario 
there is an additional negative effect working through the increased cost of being caught in 
illegal hunting. As a result, the effect on hunting effort is negative and stronger compared to 
Regime I. Increased distribution of game meat may therefore promote wildlife conservation. 
If this is the case, this policy will also succeed in improving the welfare of the local people. 
The conclusion is therefore that transfers of game meat have the potential of encouraging both 
conservation and welfare if properly linked to the cost of being caught in illegal hunting. 
 
 Table 1 about here 
 
The effect on hunting effort in Regime II of increased money transfers from tourism is 
ambiguous. The positive effect is the same as discussed for Regime I in section 3. However, 
creating a link between the money transfers and the involvement in illegal hunting increases 
the marginal cost of being caught. This additional effect works in the direction of reduced 
hunting effort. The total effect on illegal hunting and wildlife conservation is therefore 
unclear. However, as seen from Table 1, money transfers may promote wildlife conservation 
if combined with policies which increase the probability of being caught in illegal hunting. In 
this case, income transfers may also improve the welfare of the local people. The remaining 
comparative static results are reported in Table 119. 
 
5. Numerical analysis 
The theoretical reasoning will now be illustrated by data which fits the wildebeest exploitation 
in the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem. This ecosystem is positioned on the border between 
Tanzania and Kenya and contains the world’s largest ungulate herds (Sinclair and Arcese 
1995, Barrett and Arcese 1998). The Serengeti National Park is a part of it, and compromises 
more than half of the ecosystem’s land area (Barrett and Arcese 1998). The outer area of 
focus in the numerical analysis is the border area along the western corridor of the park where 
most of the poaching takes place. This area has experienced a rapid growth in human 
settlement (Campbell and Hofer 1995, Barrett and Arcese 1998) which coincides with a 
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marked increase in the number of poachers arrested in the park (Arcese et al. 1995). As a 
result, Sinclair (1995, p. 24) states that ''the illegal killing of the migrant ungulates by 
poachers is potentially the most serious threat to the Serengeti system''. 
 
The local people living on the western border of the park are mainly agro-pastoralists 
(Kauzeni and Kiwasila 1994). In addition, a survey conducted in Bunda and Serengeti District 
in 2001 predicts that almost 30 per cent of the households in this area are involved in illegal 
hunting (Johannesen 2002). Hunting in the protected area is illegal, i.e. there are no local 
property rights to wildlife. However, local people in western Serengeti benefit from the 
existing ICDP in the area, namely the Serengeti Regional Conservation Project. This project 
was implemented during 1993/1994 and aims to improve wildlife conservation mainly 
through distribution of game meat from the managed harvest of wild ungulates (see Barrett 
and Arcese 1998 and Rugumayo 1999). In addition, a revenue-sharing programme exists for 
one village in Serengeti District, under which the village receives money transfers from 
tourism activities established within the village area20. These benefit-sharing strategies are not 
subject to any risk of being expelled from the transfers as discussed in section 4. The current 
management regime in Serengeti is therefore characterised as an ICDP of Regime I. 
  
The economic and ecological parts of the model are specified at the scale of one km2 and one 
year. This means that the simulation results below report the wildlife density, that is, the 
number of animals per km2. The closer definitions of the protected area and the outer area are 
found in Appendix 2. The baseline values for transfers, anti-poaching law enforcement, 
ecological data, and data for crop production and hunting used in the simulations are derived 
from the model of Regime I and also presented here. As demonstrated above, the conservation 
effect of money transfers and game meat distribution depend critically on the design of the 
benefit-sharing scheme. Because of the unclear effects, the coefficients m and µ, as well as 
ω , will be varied throughout the simulations. 
 
Table 2 demonstrates how wildlife abundance varies with the culling coefficient m under the 
two regimes. The first column reports the results in Regime I, while the others give the results 
in Regime II when there is a link related to game meat distribution only (second column) and 
in the case where there also is a link to the income transfers from tourism (third column). In 
baseline 00020.m = , and, consequently, wildlife density is 50=IX  and 185=IEW . As 
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demonstrated in the theoretical analysis, increased legal offtake reduces the degree of wildlife 
conservation in this scenario. Compared to the baseline regime, the degree of wildlife 
conservation is not affected by introducing a link between involvement in illegal hunting and 
the benefit transfers. This is because the current transfers generate such a small amount of 
legal meat and income so that, all else equal, the expected cost of being caught only just 
increases when a risk of being expelled from the benefit-sharing programme is created. On the 
other hand, we see that a ‘high’ culling rate is sufficient to ensure that a link on game meat 
distribution will promote both wildlife conservation and local welfare. In fact, this is the case 
for a culling rate up to 9 per cent of the wildlife stock. Hence, in this range, the reduction in 
illegal hunting more than offsets the legal offtake. Contrary to Barrett and Arcese (1998), this 
indicates that the culling programme may succeed in promoting both wildlife conservation 
and local welfare if the distribution of meat is properly linked to the illegal hunting. However, 
if the culling rate exceeds 9 per cent, the degree of conservation reduces with a higher culling 
rate.  
 
 Table 2 about here 
 
The simulations show, for both regimes, that the degree of wildlife conservation varies 
slightly with the money transfers from the tourism sector (see Appendix 2, Table A2). This 
means that the risk of being excluded from the money transfers cannot conquer the effect 
working through an increased expected income. Consequently, as seen in Table 2, there is no 
additional conservation effect of linking both benefit transfers to the illegal hunting. This 
suggests that a link on game meat distribution combined with a higher culling rate is a more 
promising strategy in order to fulfil the aim of a higher degree of wildlife conservation and 
improved welfare for the local people.  
 
Let us turn to the wage rate in the formal sector. The theoretical analysis of Regime I revealed 
an ambiguous relationship between wildlife conservation and the wage rate ω . The numerical 
analysis discloses, however, a positive relationship. See Table 3. This means that the 
increased alternative cost of hunting is the dominating effect. Consequently, subsidies which 
stimulate increased wage rate in formal employment will promote both wildlife conservation 
and the welfare of the local people.  
 
 Table 3 about here 
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As discussed in the theoretical analysis of Regime I in section 3, a higher fine level may 
increase the degree of wildlife conservation without deteriorating the economic conditions of 
the local people. This will be the case if the conservation effect is relatively strong, so that the 
local community experiences a net gain due to increased transfers of game meat and money 
from the tourism sector. Table 4 demonstrates that the welfare is barely sensitive to a 
changing fine level. In fact, a double fine will increase the wildlife stock and leave local 
welfare unchanged. 
 
 Table 4 about here 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
The attempt of wildlife ICDPs is to link conservation in protected areas to economic 
development in the surrounding communities. However, many of the existing ICDPs have 
experienced difficulties which may be traced to the specific design of the projects (see 
Brandon and Wells 1992, Wells and Brandon 1992, Barrett and Arcese 1995, Gibson and 
Marks 1995). The central contribution of this exercise is to highlight some possible pitfalls, 
and to clarify in what way the management design is crucial for the success of ICDPs. In 
order to do so, this paper presents a hunter-agrarian community located on the periphery of a 
protected area. Hunting performed by the local people is illegal, but the law enforcement 
imposed by the park manager is not sufficient to eliminate the illegal hunting. Markets exist 
for labour and agricultural commodities, while no market is present for game meat.  
 
The theoretical model specifies two alternative ICDP designs for benefit transfers, i.e. 
distribution of game meat from managed culling and transfers of income from the tourism 
sector. In the first regime, the project manager fails to link the benefit transfers to the illegal 
hunting. Consequently, the local people receive game meat and money from tourism 
independent of whether they get caught in illegal hunting. This regime is in accordance with 
most of the existing ICDPs. In the second regime the project manager imposes on the local 
people a continuous risk of being expelled from the benefit transfers if caught in illegal 
hunting. Hence, in addition to the risk of receiving a monetary fine, there is also a risk of 
being denied benefit transfers.  
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It is demonstrated that the success of benefit sharing is conditional on the ICDP design. A 
benefit-sharing scheme implemented without a proper link to illegal hunting is less likely to 
succeed in gaining wildlife conservation. In fact, it turns out that both game meat distribution 
and money transfers from tourism will contribute to wildlife degradation in this regime. 
Transfers of game meat fail because the reduction in illegal hunting is not sufficient to offset 
increased culling. Money transfers from tourism fail because a higher level of the certain 
income enables the local people to carry more risk and makes them less dependent on the 
income from formal employment.  
 
In order for benefit sharing to succeed, this analysis shows that there must be a risk for the 
local people of being expelled from the transfers if they get caught in illegal hunting. If such a 
risk is present, distribution of game meat and money transfers may succeed in promoting both 
wildlife conservation and human welfare. These results are in contrast to the conclusion of 
Barrett and Arcese (1998). In the case of Serengeti we have seen that a link on game meat 
distribution combined with a higher culling rate leads to a higher degree of wildlife 
conservation and improved economic conditions of the local people.  
 
Another important result of this study is that a higher return from formal employment may 
promote wildlife conservation. As long as the effect working through an increased alternative 
cost of hunting is relatively strong, the local people will shift the allocation of labour from 
illegal hunting to formal employment. This will be the case in areas with limited opportunities 
for formal employment. For the case of Serengeti we have seen that a higher wage rate in 
formal employment reduces the pressure on wildlife and improves the livelihood of the local 
people. 
 
The general conclusion of this analysis is that work should be done in order to design some 
type of explicit agreement over the benefit-sharing instruments between the management 
authorities and the local people. This agreement must specify the rights and duties of the 
respective parties and must be supported by enforceable penalties that provide enough 
incentives for the parties to comply. However, in practice, designing such contracts may be 
difficult, especially in poor African countries where the local people lack resources or power 
to secure their interests. Still, ICDP projects need to let go of the assumption that transfers and 
support alone will make people who live in periphery areas refrain from illegal hunting in 
absence of sufficient anti-poaching law enforcement and penalties (see also Wells and 
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Brandon 1992). Projects partly depending on guard patrols and penalties are not inconsistent 
with the ICDP concept if combined with attempts to improve the welfare of the local people. 
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Appendix 1 
1. Regime I 
In Regime I, where there is no link between benefit transfers and involvement in illegal 
hunting, the effect on hunting effort and wildlife conservation of altering the management 
instruments are found by taking the total differential of (8) (with dX/dt = 0) and (11). In the 
following, we specify αAAA Ck)C(U =  and βGGG Ck)C(V = , where 0>ik  i = A, G, 10 ≤<α  
and 10 ≤< β . For risk-averse poachers 1<α  and 1<β . The differential is given in (A1) 
where 
hE
λ  denotes the derivative of (11) with respect to Eh, Xλ  the derivative of (11) with 
respect to X etc. 
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The sign of [ ]221 X)E('fCk)( hGGEh −−= βββλ  21 X)E(''fCk hGG −+ ββ  
[ ] 22211 )P/()C(E)C)(E(k)( AcAheAhA ωδδαα αα −− +−−+ [ ] AcAeAA P/)C()C(k ωδα αα 112 −− −+  is 
negative, while the sign of 
[ ] 22212 11 AcAheAhAhGGX P/)X('S)C(E)C)(E(k)()E('fCk ωµδδααβλ ααβ −−− +−−−= [ ] AcAeAA P/)X('S)C()C(k µδα αα 11 −− −−  
is positive. The determinant of the system, r/K)E('f hXEh λλ − , is therefore negative. 
01 22 >−= − X)E('fCk)( hGGm βββλ , 
[ ] 22211 AcAheAhA P/)X(S)C(E)C)(E(k)( ωδδααλ ααµ −− +−−=  
[ ] 011 <−+ −− AcAeAA P/)X(S)C()C(k ααδα . The signs of 
[ ] 22211 AcAheAhA P/N)C(E)C)(E(k)( ωδδααλ ααω −− +−−=  
[ ]{ } AcAheAhA PCNECNEk /))(()()(1( 11 −− −+−−+ αα δδα  and  
[ ] 22211 AcAAcAheAAeAhAP P/)C)E(A()C(E)C)E(A()C)(E(k)(A ωδδααλ αα −+−−−= −−  
[ ] 2111 AcAheAhA P/)C(E)C)(E(k ωδδα αα −− +−−  
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[ ] AcAAcAeAAeAA P/)C)E(A()C()C)E(A()C(k −−−+ −− 11 ααδα are unclear. Finally, the signs 
of [ ] [ ]ααααδ ωαλ )C()C(kP/)C()C(kE cAeAAAcAeAAh −+−−= −− 11  and 
A
c
AAA
c
AAhF P/)C(kP/)C(k)(E
1221 −− +−−= αα δαωααδλ  are positive. 
 
The welfare effect 
Recall from the main text that the local people treat the wildlife stock as exogenous when 
deciding upon the optimal allocation of effort. When investigating the impact on local 
welfare, however, we must take into account the effect working through a changing wildlife 
stock. The total effect on local welfare is found by taking the differential of (5). This is given 
in equation (A2). 
 
(A2) [ ]{ AcAheAhA P/)X('S)C(E)C)(E(kdEW µδδα αα 111 −− +−=
 }dX)m)E(f(Ck hGG ++ −1ββ Xdm)C(k GG 1−+ ββ  
 [ ] µδδα αα d)P/)X(S()C(E)C)(E(k AcAheAhA 111 −− +−+  
 [ ] ωδδα αα d)P/N()C(E)C)(E(k AcAheAhA 111 −− +−+
 [ ] AcAAcAheAAeAhAA dP)C)E(A()C(E)C)E(A()C)(E()P/k( −+−−+ −− 111 αα δδα  
 [ ] δαα d)C()C(kE cAeAAh −− dF)P/)C(kE( AcAAh 1−− ααδ  
 
Here, X)C(kdm/dEW GG
1−= ββ [ ]{ AcAheAhA P/)X('S)C(E)C)(E(k µδδα αα 111 −− +−+  
} dm/dX)m)E(f(Ck hGG ++ −1ββ , where dX/dm is given from equation (A1). The same 
procedure is used in order to derive the welfare effect of the remaining exogenous variables.  
 
2. Regime II 
In the present of a link the effects are found by taking the total differential of (8) (with dX/dt = 
0) and (15) as in (A3). 
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Again, we specify the utility function as βα GGAA CkCkU += , where 0>ik  i = A, G, 10 ≤<α  
and 10 ≤< β .  The sign of [ ][ ]22211 X)E('f)C(E)C)(E(k)( hcGheGhGEh −− +−−= ββ δδββλ  
[ ] [ ] AcAeAAhcGheGhG P/)C()C(kX)E(''f)C(E)C)(E(k ωδαδδβ ααββ 1111 21 −−−− −++−+  
[ ] X)E('f)C()C(k hcGeGG 112 −− −− ββδβ  is negative from the second order maximum condition. 
The sign of [ ]112 1 −− +−= ββ δδβλ )C(E)C)(E(k)E('f cGheGhGhX  
[ ]eAAhAeA CP/))(E(k)C)(X('S δωαδαµ α −−−+ − 112  
[ ]cAAhAcA CP/)(Ek)C)(X('S δωαδδαµ α −−+ − 12  
[ ]111 −−− +−− βββδβ )C(m))C()C)((E(fk eGcGeGhG   is assumed positive, which holds whenever 
µ and m are ‘not too high’. Then, the determinant of the system, r/K)E('f hXEh λλ − , is 
negative.  
 
The sign of X)C(kX)E('f)C(k)()E( eGGh
e
GGhm
12211 −− +−−= ββ δβββδλ  is positive, 
while the sign of [ ] AeAAheAA P/)X(SCP/))(E()C(k δωαδαλ αµ +−−= − 112  is in general 
unclear. The signs of [ ] 22211 AcAheAhA P/N)C(E)C)(E(k)( ωδδααλ ααω −− +−−=  
[ ] AcAeAA P/N)C()C(k 11 −− −+ ααδα  [ ] AcAheAhA P/)C(E)C)(E(k αα δδα +−+ 1  and 
[ ] 22211 AcAAcAheAAeAhAP P/)C)E(A()C(E)C)E(A()C)(E(k)(A ωδδααλ αα −+−−−= −−  
[ ] 2111 AcAheAhA P/)C(E)C)(E(k ωδδα αα −− +−−  
[ ] AcAAcAeAAeAA P/)C)E(A()C()C)E(A()C(k −−−+ −− 11 ααδα  are unclear. The sign of 
[ ] [ ]ααββδλ )C()C(k)C()C(k cAeAAcGeGG −+−= [ ] AcAeAAh P/)C()C(kE ωα αα 11 −− −−  
[ ]11 −− −+ βββ )C()C(X)E('fkE cGeGhGh  is in general unclear. However, the first three positive 
terms dominates the fourth negative term if F, µ, and ω are ‘high’. Finally, 
[ ] AcAAhcAAF P/CP/E)()C(k +−= − ωαδαλ α 12  is positive. 
 
The welfare effect 
Again, in order to investigate the impact on local welfare of a change in the exogenous 
parameters we must take into account the effect working through a changing wildlife stock 
(see section 1 in the appendix). The total differential of (5) gives the welfare effects in (A4). 
 
  
27
 
(A4) [ ]{ AcAheAhA P/)X('S)C(E)C)(E(kdEW µδδα αα 111 −− +−=
 [ ]}dX)E(f)C(E)m)E(f()C)(E(k hcGhheGhG 111 −− ++−+ ββ δδβ  
Xdm)C(kk)E( eGGGh
11 −−+ βββδ  µαδ α d)P/)X(S)C(k)E(( AeAAh 11 −−+  
 [ ] ωδδα αα d)P/N()C(E)C)(E(k AcAheAhA 111 −− +−+    
 [ ] [ ]{ } AcAAcAheAAeAhAA dPC)E(A)C(EC)E(A)C)(E()P/k( −+−−+ −− 111 αα δδα  
 [ ] [ ]{ } δββαα d)C()C(k)C()C(kE cGeGGcAeAAh −+−−  
 dF)P/)C(kE( A
c
AAh
1−− ααδ  
  
Here, 
X)C(kk)E(dm/dEW eGGGh
11 −−= βββδ [ ]{ AcAheAhA P/)X('S)C(E)C)(E(k µδδα αα 111 −− +−+  
} dm/dX)m)E(f(Ck hGG ++ −1ββ , where dX/dm is given from equation (A3). The same 
procedure is used in order to derive the welfare effect of the remaining exogenous variables.  
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Appendix 2 
The numerical analysis 
As mentioned in the main text, the ecological model is specified for the numerical analysis at 
the scale of one km2 and one year. The same scale is also used for the agricultural benefit, as 
well as the hunting benefit, given in 1998/99 prices. The protected area, consisting of 
Serengeti National Park (SNP) and its surrounding game reserves, covers an area of some 26 
000 km2 (TANAPA 1996). The ‘outer area’ is thought of as the surrounding area on the 
western edge of the protected land. Campbell and Hofer (1995) identify the catchement area, 
i.e. the region in which the poachers reside, as the area within a maximum distance of 45 km 
to the protected land. This region constitutes some 30 500 km2 and is, in this numerical 
analysis, interpreted as the ‘outer area’. The human population in this region is estimated to be 
about 1.1 million with an average household size of about 7 persons (Campbell and Hofer 
1995). Accordingly, there will be about 5 households per km2 in the outer area. On average, it 
is assumed that 2 persons per household work in agricultural production, hunting, and formal 
sector. Hence, the effort constraint T is 10 man-labour years and, hence, NEE hA ++=10 . 
 
The numerical analysis is exemplified by the wildebeest exploitation. The wildebeest 
population is estimated to be about 1.3 million animals and the annual offtake to some 120 
000 animals (Campbell and Hofer 1995). The wildlife density in the protected area is 
therefore 50 animals per km2, while the offtake is some 5 animals per km2. Following 
Campbell and Hofer (1995), it is assumed to be 0.2 hunters per average household in western 
Serengeti. Consequently, it is one person involved in hunting at full time basis for every 5 
households, and the baseline value of hE  is accordingly 1. The hunting function in (2) is 
specified as XqEh h
γ= , where q is the catchability coefficient and γ is a scale parameter. γ is 
set to 0.9 (Barrett and Arcese 1998). By imposing the baseline value of hE  into the hunting 
function with 505 /X/h = , q is calculated to 0.1. The baseline value of the legal offtake is 
calculated from the hunting quotas of SRCP for the year 2000 hunting season. Based on a 
quota of 15 wildebeest per project village, m is set to 0.0002. The maximum specific growth 
rate is fixed as r = 0.3 (Caughley and Sinclar 1994). To calculate the wildlife stock at its base 
level the carrying capacity K is set to 75 animals per km2, meaning that the protected area can 
carry a stock of wildebeest just below 2 million animals. 
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The agricultural yield function is specified as σ)E(z)E(A AA =  with z as a productivity 
parameter and σ as a scale parameter. The scale parameter is given as 0.8 (Barrett and Arcese 
1998). According to a questionnaire among 300 households in Serengeti and Bunda Districts 
in 2001, the average plot size per household is 7.4 acres, corresponding to a cultivated area of 
a fraction of 0.15 per km2 for the average 5 households (Johannesen 2002). For the same 
districts, the value of the crop production is estimated to US$ 5 861 000 or some US$ 19 000 
per km2 cultivated land (Emerton and Mfunda 1999). At our scale of one km2, this represents 
a value of US$ 19 000×0.15 = US$ 2 850 (or US$ 570 per household). This is assumed to be 
representative for the whole outer area. The main crops grown in western Serengeti are 
sorghum, cassava, maize, and cotton (SRCP 1998). Personal communication with SRCP 
(1999) indicates a per kg price of US$ 0.18 for sorghum, US$ 0.05 for cassava, US$ 0.11 for 
maize, and US$ 0.19 for cotton. By weighting the crop prices by the relative magnitude of 
these crops (SRCP 1998), the price per kilo agricultural output equals US$ 0.15, so that AP  = 
0.15. The time constraint in (3) gives NNETE hA −−=−−= 110 . Because a large fraction 
of the households in western Serengeti lack the opportunity of formal employment, it is 
assumed that only 20 per cent of the households have one person employed at full time basis 
in the formal sector. This means that the baseline value of N is set to 1 and, hence, AE  to 8. 
Consequently, the value of the crop production, i.e. 285080 =.AA zEP , is balanced with 
3600=z . This means that one labour year in agricultural production gives an output of 3600 
kilo crops. 
 
The wage rate in formal employment follows from the first order condition in (10) which 
balances with 285=ω , i.e. the annual income of full-time employment is US$ 285. This 
corresponds well with the average wage of US$ 0.8 per day paid in the food processing 
industry in Mara Region (Hofer et al. 2000). The income from tourism S(X) is interpreted as 
the revenue from public fees (entering fees, bed fees etc.) paid by tourists visiting SNP. 
According to Kauzeni and Kiwasila (1994), the income from fees in 1993 was US$ 420 000 
or some US$ 5 per tourist. It is assumed that the average fee is fixed at the level of US$ 5. 
Kauzeni and Kiwasila (1994) report that the number of tourists visiting SNP in 1990 was 63 
000 with an average annual growth equal to 7000 tourists in the period of 1984-1990. Using 
the same annual growth, the number of visitor in 1999 is calculated to 126 000. This gives an 
income from fees of US$ 630 000. Records from the village administration in Robanda show 
that this village received US$ 17 000 from the wildlife lodge in its village area. This 
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corresponds to 3% of the annual tourism income and, hence, µ is set to 0.03. Because the 
model is specified at the scale of one km2, we must correct for this in S(X). The ratio of the 
tourism income to the value of crop production equals 0.11 which must also be the case at the 
scale of one km2. Therefore, the baseline value of S(X) is set to 314. S(X) is specified as 
XlnPTε , where 5=TP  is the average fee paid per tourist and Xlnε is the number of tourists 
which depends on the wildlife density, where 0>ε . Then, solving for ε gives 16=ε .  
 
When it comes to the probability of being caught in illegal hunting, Hofer et al. (2000) 
provide an estimate equal to 0.002 per day. If the hunter spends all hunting effort on one 
continuously hunting trip, then the probability of being caught equals 703650020 .. =× . In 
reality, however, the hunter divides the hunting effort between several hunting trips so that the 
hunting effort also includes time spent travelling between the home area and the protected 
area. If the probability of being caught is lower when travelling outside the protected area, 
then a value of 0.7 represents an overestimation of δ. In the following, we set the baseline of δ 
to half of this value, i.e. 350.=δ . This means that the probability of being caught for a full 
time hunter is 0.35 a year. Based on Hofer et al. (2000), the fine F equals US$ 110.26. 
Finally, )C(U A  is specified as 
α
AACkU =  with 50.=α  and 1=Ak , while )C(V G  is 
specified as βGGCkV =  with 20.=β . Then, in order to fit the model to its baseline values 
Gk  is set to 30. Table A1 summarises the baseline parameter values. 
 
 Table A1 about here 
 
 Table A2 about here 
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Tables 
 
 Table 1: The conservation effect of the respective policies and the corresponding welfare 
 effect*. 
  XI  EWI   XII  EWII 
 
 m 
 
- 
+    if µ, m are ‘small’;  
  
- if µ, m are ‘high’
 
+/-   
     
+/-     
 
 µ 
 
- 
+    if S’(X), m are 
 ‘small’;      
-  if S’(X), m are 
+    if δ is ‘high’;
  
-     if δ is ‘low’;
+**   
 
-    if S’(X),  m are   
 
 ω 
+    if N is ‘low’;   
 
-  if N is ‘high’ 
+**  
 
+/- otherwise
+    if N is ‘low’;   
 
- if N is ‘high’
+**   
 
+/-  otherwise 
 
 PA 
÷   if F, δ are ‘high’;  
 
+/- otherwise
 
+/-   
-   if F, δ are ‘high’;  
 
+/-   otherwise 
 
+/-   
 
 δ 
 
+ 
+ if µ, m are ‘high’;   
  
- otherwise 
+ if F, µ, and ω are 
 ‘high’ 
+/- otherwise 
+ if µ is ‘high’  
 
- otherwise 
 
 F 
 
+ 
+ if µ, m are ‘high’;   
  
- otherwise 
 
+ 
+ if µ, m are ‘high’;   
  
- otherwise 
* This table reports possible negative impact of m, µ and ω on the welfare of the local people. This occurs 
because of the effect working through a changing wildlife stock. If we assume that the local people are not able 
to calculate the impact on the future stock size, they may accept higher transfers and a higher wage level even if 
the welfare effect turns out as negative. 
** Here, given a positive conservation effect, the welfare effect is unambiguously positive. 
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Table 2: Simulation results of a changing culling fraction m*.  
 No risk of exclusion  Risk of exclusion from  
meat distribution 
Risk of exclusion from  
meat and money transfers 
 XI EWI XII EWII XII EWII 
00020.m =  50 185 50 185 50 185 
090.m =  45 191 52 192 52 192 
10.m =  44 192 50 193 50 193 
* Here, X measures the stock density. All parameters except m are fixed at their respective baseline value. 
 
 
           Table 3: Simulation results of a changing wage rate ω *. 
 XI EWI 
285=ω  50 185 
430=ω  56 205 
570=ω  58 228 
 * Here, X measures the stock density. All parameters except  
   ω are fixed at their respective baseline value. 
 
 
 
           Table 4: Simulation results of a changing fine level F*. 
 XI EWI 
110=F  50 185 
220=F  53 185 
440=F  57 184 
* Here, X measures the stock density. All parameters except  
  F are fixed at their  respective baseline value. 
 
 
Table A1: Baseline values economical and ecological parameters 
Parameter Description Value 
AP  Crop price 0.15 ($/kg) 
α Scale parameter utility of agric. output 0.5 
kA Linear parameter utility of agric. output 1 
β Scale parameter utility of game meat 0.2 
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kG Linear parameter utility of game meat 30 
σ Input elasticity labour crop production 0.8 
z Productivity crop production 3600 (kg) 
T Available labour effort, man-labour years 10  
q Catchability coefficient 0.1 
γ Input elasticity labour hunting 0.9 
ω Wage rate formal employment 285 ($) 
µ Fraction of tourism income 
transferred to every 5 households 
0.03 
TP  Average fee 5 ($/tourist) 
ε Constant, tourism income 16 
δ Marginal probability of detection  0.35 
F Fine imposed if detected in illegal hunting 110.26 ($) 
m Cropping ratio 0.0002 
K Carrying capacity 75 (animal/km2) 
r Intrinsic growth rate 0.3 
 
 
          Table A2: Simulation results of changing the money transfers µ*.  
 In Regime II: link on money transfers only. 
 XI EWI XII EWII 
µ = 0.03 50 185 50 185 
µ = 0.15 50 186 51 186 
 * Here X measures the stock density. All parameters except µ are fixed at their respective 
    baseline value.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1 When it comes to game meat distribution, the opposite result occurs in Skonhoft’s model (1998). 
This stems from the fact that Skonhoft considers the local people as passive, while the park manager, 
who benefits from both legal hunting and tourism, is the active agent. When the state instructs the park 
manager to distribute a fraction of the legal harvest to the local people, the marginal return on hunting 
is reduced relative to the marginal return on non-consumptive tourism services and, consequently, the 
manager increases the investment in wildlife. With a passive local community, this promotes wildlife 
conservation. 
 
2 The intuition is that when a labour market is present the household is able to alter the effort use in 
agriculture by adjusting its labour supply in formal employment, while the effort use in wildlife 
harvesting is left unchanged, and vice versa.   
 
3 For a broad discussion of protected areas and law enforcement, see Martin (1993). 
 
4 See e.g. Wright (1999) for a further discussion of culling operations as a tool in wildlife 
management. 
 
5 There are assumed to be conflicting interests among the local people. Hence, prevalence of 
individual conformity to group norms is assumed to be present. In line with traditional reasoning, it is 
assumed that the elders are in charge of the group’s activities (Marks 1984).   
 
6 Concavity of f may be due to technological restrictions such as access to weapons, transport etc. It is 
seen that if f’’ = 0, (2) is in line with the Schaefer harvesting function. 
 
7 N is endogenous in this model. One may argue that there are constraints on the working hours in 
formal employment, which makes it difficult for individuals to adjust the working hours to changes in 
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the wage rate in that sector. However, T is interpreted as the size of the human population and, hence, 
changes in N are due to individuals choosing not to work or to enter employment in the formal sector 
without altering the individual working hours.  
 
8 We assume that the consumption level does not fall below a particular threshold or subsistence level 
at which point the local people would be attracted to the risk in order to avoid disaster. 
  
9 In the case of Serengeti the quota (mX) is set low relative to the wildlife stock for each village 
receiving meat from the culling program, meaning that m is low in the culling of today (see Appendix 
2).   
 
10 For a discussion of a broader distribution scheme, see Brandon and Wells (1992).  
 
11 The absence of a market for game meat captures the nature of the village economy in this 
commodity in Serengeti (see also Barrett and Arcese 1998). While there is trade in meat among 
households within and between villages in the catchment area, there is a small and negligible trade 
outside the catchment area. See note 14-15 for the impact of a change in this assumption.  
 
12 Hence, the ecological equilibrium restricts the size of m: as X approaches zero m = r – f(Eh).  
 
13 The actual welfare of the local people is strictly dependent on the realized consumption bundle, i.e. 
it is conditional upon whether they are caught in illegal hunting. More precisely, the actual welfare 
level is higher if the local people manage to escape the patrol units. However, we cannot observe 
which of the two states are realized. Instead, we investigate the welfare effect of ICDP by deriving its 
impact on the expected utility function.  
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14 It can be demonstrated that the conservation effect is negative also when a market for game meat is 
present. 
 
15 If a market for game meat is present, then the money transfers work as lump sum transfers which do 
not alter the hunting decision of the local people. Hence, in this case, money transfers do not alter the 
size of the wildlife stock.  
 
16 Skonhoft and Solstad (1998) present a model of a producer (firm) who sells both agricultural output 
and game meat on the market, while no market exists for labour. In their model, the alternative cost of 
hunting equals the foregone return from agricultural production and, therefore, a higher agricultural 
price reduces the hunting effort. Assuming that a market exists for game meat, and 0=N  makes the 
present model similar to the profit-maximizing model of Skonhoft and Solstad (1998). 
 
17 The link presented here is implemented so that the management authority distributes money and 
meat at the end of a period, i.e. a quarter or a year. Then, the local people do not benefit if they have 
been caught in illegal hunting during that period.   
 
18 It is assumed that (8) reads mXX)E(f)K/X(rXdt/dX h −−−= 1 , also when the local people are 
caught in illegal hunting. This means that the park manager takes out a fraction m of the stock even if 
it is not distributed to the local people. Instead, the manager distributes the meat to the management 
staff or sells it on markets outside the region.  
 
19 Note that the conservation effect of an increased marginal probability of being caught (δ) is unclear 
in Regime II. The mechanism works as follows. First, a higher δ reduces the expected utility level, 
which works in the direction of reduced hunting effort. In addition, the expected marginal agricultural 
utility increases. This strengthens the first effect. However, a higher δ also increases the expected 
marginal utility of game meat consumption, which works in the direction of increased hunting effort. 
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If the first and second effects dominate, then the conservation effect of an increased marginal 
probability of being caught is positive. This will be the case if the fine level F, the money transfers 
from tourism µ, and the wage rate in formal sector ω are ‘high’. It can be demonstrated that the 
conservation effect is positive for the numerical example presented in section 5. 
 
20 This revenue-sharing programme is of direct benefit to the village. In addition the district authorities 
and the State gain revenues from fees paid by the tourism sector (Kauzeni and Kiwasila 1994), but the 
villages complain that they do not gain any income from these fees. For a broad overview of tourism 
activities in Serengeti, see Kauzeni and Kiwasila (1994). For the objectives of Tanzanian National 
Parks regarding revenue sharing in tourism, see TANAPA (1996). 
 
 
